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Abstract
We consider estate division problems, a generalization of bankruptcy problems. We show that in
a direct revelation claim game, if the underlying division rule satises eciency, equal treatment
of equals, and weak order preservation, then all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria induce equal
division. Next, we consider division rules satisfying eciency, equal treatment of equals, and
claims monotonicity. For claim games with at most three agents, again all Nash equilibria
induce equal division. Surprisingly, this result does not extend to claim games with more than
three agents. However, if nonbossiness is added, then equal division is restored.
JEL classication: C72, D63, D71.
Keywords: Bankruptcy/estate division problems, claims monotonicity, direct revelation claim
game, equal division, equal treatment of equals, Nash equilibria, nonbossiness, (weak) order
preservation.
1 Introduction
We consider estate division problems, a generalization of bankruptcy problems, in which a positive
estate has to be divided among a set of agents. Clearly, if the agents' claims add up to less than the
estate, no con
ict occurs and each agent can receive his claimed amount. However, if the sum of
the agents' claims exceeds the estate, then bankruptcy occurs. The class of bankruptcy problems
has been extensively studied using various approaches such as the normative (axiomatic) or the
game theoretical approach (cooperative or noncooperative). For extensive surveys of the literature,
we refer to Moulin (2002) and Thomson (2003).
In bankruptcy problems the agents' claims are normally considered as xed inputs to the prob-
lem. However, in many real life situations it is impossible or dicult to check the validity of claims,
e.g., if the prot of a joint project should be split among the project participants, but inputs are not
perfectly observable or dicult to compare. Other examples are claims based on moral property
rights, entitlements (see G achter and Riedl, 2005) or subjective needs (see Pulido, Sanchez-Soriano,
and Llorca, 2002). If the authority in charge of the estate lacks the ability to verify claims or veri-
cation is too costly, agents are likely to behave strategically to ensure larger shares of the estate
for themselves.
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1We model this type of situation with a simple noncooperative game. Given the estate to divide
and based on a (division) rule, agents simply submit claims which are restricted to not exceed a
common upper bound. We analyze the (pure strategy) Nash equilibria of the resulting claim game.
We do not x any specic rule, but only require the rule to satisfy basic and appealing properties.
First, we require the rule to satisfy eciency, equal treatment of equals, and weak order preser-
vation.1 Then, all agents claiming the largest possible amount is a Nash equilibrium and all
Nash equilibria lead to equal division (Theorem 1). Two corresponding results are obtained us-
ing order preservation or others oriented claims monotonicity (Corollaries 1 and 2). Second, we
replace weak order preservation with claims monotonicity.2 Again, all agents claiming the largest
possible amount is a Nash equilibrium. However, in dierence to the previous results, we show
that equal division is guaranteed for all Nash equilibria only for claim games with at most three
agents (Theorem 2). This result does not extend to claim games with more than three agents
(Example 1). Nevertheless, if nonbossiness is added (i.e., if we require eciency, equal treatment
of equals, claims monotonicity, and non-bossiness), then equal division in all Nash equilibria is
restored (Theorem 3).3
All our results point towards the same intuitive message: if it is impossible or dicult to test
the legitimacy of claims, the con
ict will escalate to the highest possible level at which claims are
no longer informative. As a result, equal division is the \non-discriminating" outcome in Nash
equilibrium. In other words, equal division is not only a normatively appealing division method,
but it is also the result of a natural noncooperative game.4 These ndings might explain why
in many instances equal division is applied right away even without asking agents' claims. For
instance, pre-1975 U.S. Admiralty law divides liabilities equally among parties if they are both
found negligent (see Feldman and Jeonghyun, 2005). British Shipping Law, until the act of 1911,
applied equal division of costs in case of a collision between two ships, however much the degree of
their faults or negligence may dier. This practice has originated from a medieval rule, which was
originally intended to be applied only in cases where negligence cannot be perfectly proven (see
Porges and Thomas, 1963).
A number of articles also consider strategic aspects (see Thomson, 2003, Section 7). The articles
closely related to ours are Chun (1989), Thomson (1990), Moreno-Ternero (2002), Herrero (2003),
and Bochet and Sakai (2008) in that the games they consider do not focus on a specic rule, but a
class of rules that is determined by basic properties. Chun (1989) considers a noncooperative game
where agents propose rules and a sequential revision procedure then converges to equal division.
Moreno-Ternero (2002) constructs a noncooperative game, the equilibrium of which converges to
the proportional rule. A noncooperative game similar (in a sense dual) to the one in Chun (1989) is
constructed by Herrero (2003) who shows convergence to the constrained equal losses rule. Thomson
(1990) and Bochet and Sakai (2008) consider the problem of allocating an estate when agents
have single-peaked preferences and study a direct revelation game where agents report either their
preferences (Thomson, 1990) or their peaks (Bochet and Sakai, 2008). While Thomson (1990)
shows for various rules (e.g., the symmetrically proportional rule, the equal distance rule, and the
1Eciency: the estate is allocated if the sum of claims is larger than (or equal to) the estate. Equal treatment
of equals: any two agents with identical claims receive the same awards. Weak order preservation: if an agent has a
higher claim than another agent, then he does not receive less than that agent.
2Claims monotonicity: an agent does not receive less after an increase in his claim.
3Nonbossiness: no agent can change other agents' awards by changing his claim unless his award changes as well.
4A game-theoretical interpretation of our result is that if a rule satises certain natural and appealing properties
(see our results above), it can be used to implement equal division.
2equal sacrice rule) that uniform division is the only Nash equilibrium outcome, Bochet and Sakai
(2008, Theorem 2) prove this result for rules satisfying certain properties.5
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce estate division problems and
properties of rules. Furthermore, we establish logical relations between properties and dene three
well-known rules (the proportional, the constrained equal awards, and the constrained equal losses
rule). In Section 3, we introduce claim games and establish various equal division Nash equilibria
results (Theorems 1, 2, and 3, Corollaries 1 and 2, and Example 1), including a discussion of the
independence of assumptions needed to establish our results. We conclude in Section 4.
2 Estate Division Problems and Properties of Rules
An amount E 2 R++ has to be divided among a set of agents N = f1;:::;ng. For every i 2 N let
ci 2 R+ denote agent i's claim, and let c  (ci)i2N 2 RN
+ be the claims vector. An estate division
problem, or problem for short, is a pair (c;E) 2 RN
+ R++. For all c 2 C and all S  N, S 6= ;, let
cS =
P
i2S ci. Estate division problem (c;E) is a bankruptcy (or claims) problem if cN  E. We
denote by EN the class of all estate division problems.
A (division) rule is a function R : EN ! RN that associates with each problem (c;E) 2 EN an
awards vector x 2 RN
+ such that
P
xi  E and x  c.6 An awards vector x for (c;E) is ecient
if it assigns the largest possible amount of E taking claims as upper bounds, i.e., if cN  E, then P
xi = E and if cN  E, then x = c. Note that we do not require that E has to be completely
allocated among the agents if no bankruptcy occurs.7 We now introduce some properties of rules,
which are extensions of standard properties for bankruptcy rules to our more general estate division
model (see Thomson, 2003, for a comprehensive survey on the axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis
of bankruptcy problems).
Eciency: A rule R satises eciency if for all (c;E) 2 EN, R(c;E) is ecient.
The following property requires that the awards to agents whose claims are equal should be
equal.
Equal Treatment of Equals: A rule R satises equal treatment of equals if for all (c;E) 2 EN
and all i;j 2 N such that ci = cj, Ri(c;E) = Rj(c;E).
By the next requirement the rule should respect the ordering of claims as follows: if agent i's
claim is at least as large as agent j's claim, he should receive at least as much as agent j and the
dierences, calculated agent by agent, between claims and awards, should be ordered as the claims
are (see Aumann and Maschler, 1985).
Order Preservation: A rule R satises order preservation if for all (c;E) 2 EN and all i;j 2 N
such that ci  cj, Ri(c;E)  Rj(c;E) and ci   Ri(c;E)  cj   Rj(c;E).
Lemma 1. Order preservation implies equal treatment of equals.
5The properties they consider { eciency, strict own peak monotonicity, others peak monotonicity, peak order
preservation, and own peak continuity { are similar in spirit to the ones we consider for estate division problems.
However, Bochet and Sakai (2008) require more properties to obtain their result due to the dierence between their
model and our estate division model.
6Note that x  c if and only if for all i 2 N, xi  ci.
7In Appendix B we describe what happens if we require that the estate E is always completely allocated among
the agents. Then, eciency is already incorporated in the denition of a rule and results essentially do not change.
3Proof. Let rule R satisfy order preservation. Let (c;E) 2 EN and i;j 2 N such that ci = cj. Hence,
by order preservation, [ci  cj implies Ri(c;E)  Rj(c;E)] and [cj  ci implies Rj(c;E)  Ri(c;E)].
Thus, Ri(c;E) = Rj(c;E) and rule R satises equal treatment of equals.
For bankruptcy problems, order preservation re
ects a duality concerning awards and losses by
requiring order preservation of awards and order preservation of losses. A weaker order preservation
property results if only order preservation of awards is required: if agent i's claim is larger than
agent j's claim, i should receive at least as much as agent j does.
Weak Order Preservation: A rule R satises weak order preservation if for all (c;E) 2 EN and
all i;j 2 N such that ci > cj, Ri(c;E)  Rj(c;E).
The following monotonicity property requires that if an agent's claim increases, he should receive
at least as much as he did initially. We use the following notation. Let c 2 RN




+ denotes the claims vector obtained from c by replacing ci with c0
i.
Claims Monotonicity: A rule R satises claims monotonicity if for all (c;E) 2 EN and all i 2 N
such that ci < c0
i, Ri(c;E)  Ri(c0
i;c i;E).
Focusing on the other agents, we can formulate another monotonicity property: if an agent's
claim increases, then all other agents should receive at most as much as they did initially (Thomson,
2003, mentions this property after introducing claims monotonicity without giving it a name).
Others Oriented Claims Monotonicity: A rule R satises others oriented claims monotonicity
if for all (c;E) 2 EN and all i 2 N such that ci < c0
i, Rj(c;E)  Rj(c0
i;c i;E) for all j 6= i.
Note that others oriented claims monotonicity together with eciency implies claims mono-
tonicity.8 For two-agent problems the inverse conclusion is also true.
Lemma 2.
(a) Eciency and others oriented claims monotonicity imply claims monotonicity.
(b) If jNj = 2, then eciency and claims monotonicity imply others oriented claims monotonicity.
Proof.
(a) Let rule R satisfy eciency and others oriented claims monotonicity. Let (c;E) 2 EN,
i 2 N, and c0
i such that c0





















i;c i;E). Thus R sat-
ises claims monotonicity.
(b) Let rule R satisfy eciency and claims monotonicity. Let (c;E) 2 EN and assume without
loss of generality that c1 < c0
1. By claims monotonicity, R1(c;E)  R1(c0
1;c2;E). Hence, (i) E  
R1(c;E)  E R1(c0
1;c2;E). By eciency, (ii) R2(c;E) = minfc2;E R1(c;E)g and R2(c0
1;c2;E) =
minfc2;E   R1(c0
1;c2;E)g. Thus, (i) and (ii) imply R2(c;E)  R2(c0
1;c2;E) and R satises others
oriented claims monotonicity.
Using Lemma 2 (b), we can easily establish a \weak inverse" of Lemma 1 for two agent problems
if we add eciency and claims monotonicity.
8For bankruptcy problems, this result is also mentioned in Thomson (2003, p.269).
4Lemma 3. If jNj = 2, then eciency, equal treatment of equals, and claims monotonicity imply
weak order preservation.
Proof. Let rule R satisfy eciency, equal treatment of equals, and claims monotonicity. Hence, by
Lemma 2 (b), R satises others oriented claims monotonicity. Let N = f1;2g, (c;E) 2 EN, and
assume without loss of generality that c1  c2.
Let c0




2 g. Since c0
2  c2, by claims monotonicity, (i) minfc1; E
2 g = R2(c1;c0
2;E)  R2(c;E) and
by others oriented claims monotonicity, (ii) minfc1; E
2 g = R1(c1;c0
2;E)  R1(c;E). Thus, (i) and
(ii) imply R2(c;E)  R1(c;E) and R satises weak order preservation.
In Section 3 we implicitly show that both Lemma 2 (b) and Lemma 3 cannot be extended to
any number of agents.9
Finally, using Lemma 2 (a), we show that eciency, equal treatment of equals, and others
oriented claims monotonicity imply weak order preservation.
Lemma 4. Eciency, equal treatment of equals and others oriented claims monotonicity imply
weak order preservation.
Proof. Let R satisfy eciency, equal treatment of equals and others oriented claims monotonicity.
Then, by Lemma 2 (a), R satises claims monotonicity. Let (c;E) 2 EN and i;j 2 N such that
ci > cj. Let c0




j . Hence, by claims monotonicity, (ii) Rj(c;E)  Rj(c0
j;c j;E) and by others oriented claims
monotonicity, (iii) Ri(c;E)  Ri(c0
j;c j;E). Thus, (i), (ii), and (iii) imply Ri(c;E)  Rj(c;E) and
R satises weak order preservation.
Most well-known bankruptcy rules satisfy all the properties mentioned above; e.g., the con-
strained equal awards, the constrained equal losses, and the proportional rule. We introduce e-
cient extensions of these well-known bankruptcy rules to (estate division) rules.
The constrained equal awards rule allocates the estate as equally as possible taking claims as
upper bounds.
Constrained Equal Awards Rule: For all (c;E) 2 EN,
(i) if cN  E, then CEA(c;E) = c and
(ii) if cN  E, then for all j 2 N, CEAj(c;E) = minfcj;ceag,
where cea is such that
P
minfci;ceag = E.
The constrained equal losses rule allocates the shortage of the estate in an equal way, keeping
shares bounded below by zero.
Constrained Equal Losses Rule: For all (c;E) 2 EN,
(i) if cN  E, then CEL(c;E) = c and
(ii) if cN  E, then for all j 2 N, CELj(c;E) = maxf0;cj   celg,
where cel is such that
P
maxf0;ci   celg = E.
9The rule described in Example 1 satises eciency, equal treatment of equals, claims monotonicity, but neither
others oriented claims monotonicity nor weak order preservation.
5The proportional rule allocates the estate proportionally with respect to claims.
Proportional Rule: For all (c;E) 2 EN,
(i) if cN  E, then P(c;E) = c and
(ii) if cN  E, then P(c;E) = pc, where p = E
cN .
3 Claim Games, Nash Equilibria, and Equal Division
Given an estate E 2 RN
++, assume that each agent can choose a claim from a strategy set Ci  R+.
Let C = C1  :::  Cn. Then, for each rule R and estate E we dene the claim game  (R;E) by
assigning to each reported claims vector c 2 C the awards vector R(c;E). A claims vector ^ c 2 C
is a Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) of claim game  (R;E) if for all i 2 N and all c0
i 2 Ci,
Ri(^ c;E)  Ri(c0
i;^ c i;E). We call R(^ c;E) the Nash equilibrium outcome. We require that for all
agents i 2 N the strategy set Ci is compact. Hence, for all i 2 N,  ci  maxCi and  c  ( ci)i2N are
well-dened. For example, we could assume Ci = [0;E] for all i 2 N.10
Since all agents' preferences are strictly monotonic over the amount of the estate that they
receive, any Nash equilibrium of a claim game that is based on an ecient rule has to distribute
the whole estate if that is possible given upper bounds on reported claims,  c. This implies that at
any Nash equilibrium ^ c in which agents do not claim their maximal possible amounts (^ c 6=  c), the
sum of reported claims already adds up to at least the estate (^ cN  E). We show this formally.
Lemma 5. If R is ecient, then for any Nash equilibrium ^ c of the claim game  (R;E), ^ c 6=  c
implies ^ cN  E.
Proof. Let R be ecient and assume that ^ c 6=  c is a Nash equilibrium of the claim game  (R;E)
such that ^ cN < E. Let   E   ^ cN > 0 and dene for some j 2 N such that ^ c 6=  cj, c0
j 
minf cj;^ cj + g > ^ cj. Then, by eciency, R(^ c;E) = ^ c and R(c0
j;^ c j;E) = (c0
j;^ c j). Hence,
Rj(^ c;E) = ^ cj < c0
j = Rj(c0
i;^ c i;E); contradicting that ^ c is a Nash equilibrium of  (R;E).
We denote by 1 = (1;:::;1) 2 RN
++ the one-vector.
Equal Division: Given an estate E 2 RN
++, E
n1 2 RN
++ denotes the corresponding equal division
vector.
Next, we present our rst main result: we show that for claim games where agents have equal
maximal strategies and the underlying rule satises eciency, equal treatment of equals, and weak
order preservation, (a) claiming the maximal amount is always a Nash equilibrium and (b) all Nash
equilibria induce equal division.
Theorem 1. Assume that for some k 2 R++,  c = k1. Let R satisfy eciency, equal treatment of
equals, and weak order preservation. Then,
(a) ^ c =  c is a Nash equilibrium of the claim game  (R;E) and
(b) all Nash equilibria of the claim game  (R;E) have the equal division vector minfk; E
ng1 as
equilibrium outcome.
10Alternatively, instead of requiring that all strategy sets are compact we could require that for all i 2 N, Ci = R+
and rule R satises claims truncation invariance, i.e., for all (c;E) 2 E
N, R(c;E) = R(minfc1;Eg;:::;minfcn;Eg;E).
6Proof.
(a) We prove that ^ c =  c = k1 is a Nash equilibrium of the claim game  (R;E). By eciency and
equal treatment of equals, R(^ c;E) = minfk; E
ng1. If R(^ c;E) = k1, then each agent already gets
the largest possible amount and ^ c is a Nash equilibrium.
Thus, assume that R(^ c;E) = E
n1 <k1: Let i 2 N and c0
i 6= ^ ci. Thus, for all j 6= i, c0
i <
k = ^ cj. Hence, by weak order preservation, for all j 6= i, Rj(c0
i;^ c i;E)  Ri(c0
i;^ c i;E): Suppose
that Ri(c0
i;^ c i;E) > E
n. Then, for all l 2 N, Rl(c0




i;^ c i;;E) > E; a
contradiction. Thus, Ri(c0
i;^ c i;E)  E
n = Ri(^ c;E) and ^ c is a Nash equilibrium of the claim game
 (R;E).
(b) Suppose that ^ c is a Nash equilibrium of the claim game  (R;E) and R(^ c;E) 6= minfk; E
ng1.
Then, for some i 2 N, Ri(^ c;E) < minfk; E
ng. Let c0
i = k (possibly c0
i = ^ ci). Since ^ c is a Nash
equilibrium, Ri(c0
i;^ c i;E)  Ri(^ c;E) < minfk; E
ng. In particular, (i) Ri(c0
i;^ c i;E) < E
n.
Since by (a),  c is a Nash equilibrium such that R( c;E) = minfk; E
ng1, we know that ^ c 6=  c.
Thus, by Lemma 5, ^ cN  E. Recall that c0
i = k  ^ ci. Hence, c0
i +
P




i;^ c i;E) = E. For all j 6= i such that ^ cj < k = c0
i, by weak order preservation and (i),
Rj(c0
i;^ c i;E)  Ri(c0
i;^ c i;E) < E
n. For all j 6= i such that ^ cj = k = c0
i, by equal treatment of
equals and (i), Rj(c0
i;^ c i;E) = Ri(c0




i;^ c i;E) < E; a contradiction
to (ii).
Remark 1. Independence of Assumptions in Theorem 1
(i) Suppose that there exist i;j 2 N such that  ci 6=  cj. Then, an \unequal" Nash equilibrium
outcome is possible for a rule satisfying eciency, equal treatment of equals, and weak order
preservation; e.g., for the proportional rule, for all (c;E) 2 EN,  c is a Nash equilibrium, but for all
i;j such that  ci 6=  cj, Pi( c;E) 6= Pj( c;E).
(ii) The following rule R0 satises equal treatment of equals, weak order preservation, but not
eciency. If c 6=  c, then R0(c;E) = P(c;E) and R0( c;E) = 01. Clearly,  c is not a Nash equilibrium
of the claim game  (E;R0) and the equal division vector minfk; E
ng1 is never an equilibrium
outcome.
(iii) A serial dictatorship rule that rst serves agents with the highest claims lexicographically (i.e.,
if several agents have the highest claim, then rst serve the agent with the lowest index and so on)
satises eciency and weak order preservation, but not equal treatment of equals. There are Nash
equilibria, e.g., ^ c = k1 when nk > E, at which agent 1 receives more than agent n.
(iv) The following rule R00 satises eciency and equal treatment of equals, but not weak order
preservation. Rule R00 rst assigns the estate E proportionally (and eciently) among all agents
who have a claim dierent from that of agent 1. Then, if some part of the estate is left, R00 allocates
it equally (and eciently) among the remaining agents. For  c  E1,  c is not a Nash equilibrium of
the claim game  (E;R00) and the equal division vector minfk; E
ng1 is not an equilibrium outcome. 
Theorem 1 and Lemma 1 imply the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Assume that for some k 2 R++,  c = k1. Let R satisfy eciency and order preser-
vation. Then,
(a) ^ c =  c is a Nash equilibrium of the claim game  (R;E) and
(b) all Nash equilibria of the claim game  (R;E) have the equal division vector minfk; E
ng1 as
equilibrium outcome.
7Theorem 1 and Lemma 4 imply the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Assume that for some k 2 R++,  c = k1. Let R satisfy eciency, equal treatment of
equals, and others oriented claims monotonicity. Then,
(a) ^ c =  c is a Nash equilibrium of the claim game  (R;E) and
(b) all Nash equilibria of the claim game  (R;E) have the equal division vector minfk; E
ng1 as
equilibrium outcome.
Next, we present our second main result: we show that for claim games where agents have
equal maximal strategies and the underlying rule satises eciency, equal treatment of equals, and
claims monotonicity, (a) claiming the maximal amount is always a Nash equilibrium and (b) for
n  3, all Nash equilibria induce equal division.
Theorem 2. Assume that for some k 2 R++,  c = k1. Let R satisfy eciency, equal treatment of
equals, and claims monotonicity. Then,
(a) ^ c =  c is a Nash equilibrium of the claim game  (R;E) and
(b) for n  3, all Nash equilibria of the claim game  (R;E) have the equal division vector
minfk; E
ng1 as equilibrium outcome.
Proof.
(a) By claims monotonicity, for each agent i it is a weakly dominant strategy to claim  ci. Hence,
 c is a Nash equilibrium of  (R;E).
(b) For n = 1, the proof is obvious and therefore omitted.
Let n = 2. By Lemma 3, eciency, equal treatment of equals, and claims monotonicity imply
weak order preservation. By Theorem 1 (b), eciency, equal treatment of equals, and weak order
preservation imply the result.
Let n = 3. Suppose that ^ c is a Nash equilibrium of the claim game  (R;E) and R(^ c;E) 6=
minfk; E
3 g1. Without loss of generality, we assume that ^ c1  ^ c2  ^ c3.
Case 1: i 2 f1;2g  fi;jg and Ri(^ c;E) < minfk; E
3 g.
Let c0
i = ^ c3 (possibly c0
i = ^ c1). Since ^ c is a Nash equilibrium, Ri(c0
i;^ c i;E)  Ri(^ c;E) < minfk; E
3 g.
In particular, (i) Ri(c0
i;^ c i;E) < E
3 .
Since by (a),  c is a Nash equilibrium such that R( c;E) = minfk; E
ng1, we know that ^ c 6=  c.
Thus, by Lemma 5, ^ cN  E. Hence, c0
i +
P
l6=i ^ cl  E and by eciency, (ii)
P
Rl(c0
i;^ c i;E) = E.
By equal treatment of equals and (i), R3(c0
i;^ c i;E) = Ri(c0
i;^ c i;E) < E
3 . Hence, (ii) implies (iii)
Rj(c0
i;^ c i;E) > E
3 .
Recall that j 2 f1;2g and therefore, ^ cj  ^ c3. Let c0
j = ^ c3 and consider (c0
i;c0
j;^ c3;E) = (^ c31;E).
By equal treatment of equals, (i) and (iii) imply ^ cj < ^ c3. Hence, c0
i +c0





j;^ c3;E) = E. By claims monotonicity, Rj(c0
i;c0
j;^ c3;E)  Rj(c0
i;^ c i;E) > E
3 and
by equal treatment of equals, Rj(c0
i;c0
j;^ c3;E) = Ri(c0
i;c0
j;^ c3;E) = R3(c0
i;c0
j;^ c3;E) > E
3 . Hence, P
Rl(c0
i;c0
j;^ c3;E) > E; a contradiction to (iv).
Case 2: R3(^ c;E) < minfk; E
3 g.
First, R3(^ c;E) < minfk; E
3 g implies (v) R3(^ c;E) < E
3 . Furthermore, if ^ c2 = ^ c3, then by equal
treatment of equals, R2(^ c;E) = R3(^ c;E) < minfk; E
3 g, and we are done by Case 1. Hence, assume
that ^ c2 < ^ c3. Let c0
3 = ^ c2 and consider (c0
3;^ c 3;E).
8Since by (a),  c is a Nash equilibrium such that R( c;E) = minfk; E
ng1, we know that ^ c 6=  c.
Thus, by Lemma 5, ^ cN  E. Hence, by eciency, (vi)
P
Rl(^ c;E) = E. Then, (v) and (vi)
imply R1(^ c;E) > E
3 or R2(^ c;E) > E
3 . Note that R1(^ c;E)  ^ c1  ^ c2 and R2(^ c;E)  ^ c2. Thus,
c0
3 > R3(^ c;E) and ^ c1 + ^ c2 + c0
3 
P




3;^ c 3;E) = E. By claims monotonicity, (viii) R3(c0
3;^ c 3;E)  R3(^ c;E) < E
3 .
By equal treatment of equals, R2(c0
3;^ c 3;E) = R3(c0
3;^ c 3;E) < E
3 . Hence, (vii) implies (ix)
R1(c0
3;^ c 3;E) > E
3 .
Let c0
1 = ^ c2 and consider (c0
1;c0
3;^ c2;E) = (^ c21;E). By equal treatment of equals, (viii) and
(ix) imply ^ c1 < c0
3 = ^ c2. Hence, c0
1 + c0




3;^ c2;E) = E.
By claims monotonicity, R1(c0
1;c0
3;^ c2;E)  R1(c0
3;^ c 3;E) > E
3 and by equal treatment of equals,
R1(c0
1;c0
3;^ c2;E) = R2(c0
1;c0
3;^ c2;E) = R3(c0
1;c0





3;^ c2;E) > E; a
contradiction to (x).
Remark 2. Independence of Assumptions in Theorem 2
Note that claims monotonicity alone implies Theorem 2 (a). Hence, we show independence only
for Theorem 2 (b).
(i) The proof that the assumption  c = k1 is needed is the same as in Remark 1 (i).
(ii) The following rule ~ R satises claims monotonicity and equal treatment of equals, but not
eciency. If at c exactly one agent i claims ci =  ci, then he receives ~ Ri(c;E) = minfk; E
ng and
for all j 6= i, ~ Ri(c;E) = 0. Furthermore, ~ R( c;E) = minfk; E
ng1 and for all other claim vectors c,
~ R(c;E) = 01. Then, Nash equilibria which do not induce equal division exist, e.g., for N = f1;2;3g
and E = k = 1, ~ c = (1;0;0) resulting in the equilibrium outcome ~ R(~ c;1) = (1=3;0;0).
(iii) To prove that equal treatment of equals is needed one can use the serial dictatorship rule as
described in Remark 1 (iii) { it satises eciency and claims monotonicity, but not equal treatment
of equals.
(iv) To prove that claims monotonicity is needed one can use rule R00 as described in Remark 1 (iv)
{ it satises eciency and equal treatment of equals, but not claims monotonicity. 
In the following example, we show that when n > 3, eciency, equal treatment of equals, and
claims monotonicity are not sucient to guarantee equal division in all Nash equilibria of the claim
game  (R;E).
Example 1. Let N = f1;2;3;4g, E = 1, and for all i 2 N, Ci = [0;1]. Before we dene rule R of
claim game  (R;1), we introduce some notation.
Let H = 1=2 and L = 1=3 be two points, which we will use to partition the set of claim proles.
For all proles c 2 C, let LH(c) = fi 2 N : L  ci  Hg, L(c) = fi 2 N : ci < Lg, and
H(c) = fi 2 N : ci > Hg. For all j = 0;1;:::;4, denote by Cj the set of claim proles in which
j agents claim between L and H and n   j agents claim more than H. That is, Cj = fc 2 C :
jLH(c)j = j and jH(c)j = n   jg. Let P = C n [4
j=0Cj. Note that for all claim proles c 2 P,
there exists some agent i 2 N for which ci < L. Furthermore, note that the collection of sets Cj
(j = 1;:::;4) and P partition the set of claim proles C.
For all c 2 P, dene B(c) to be the maximal set of agents such that
(i) cB(c)  1, i.e., the sum of claims of agents in B(c) does not exceed the estate, and
(ii) for all i;l 2 N, if ci  cl and l 2 B(c), then i 2 B(c), i.e., if agent l is a member of B(c), then
all agents with claims larger than or equal to cl are also members of B(c).
9Let D(c) = fi 2 N n B(c) : for all l 2 N n B(c); ci  clg, i.e., if B(c) 6= N, then D(c) 6= ; contains
the set of agents that have the highest claim among the agents in N n B(c). Note that D(c) = ; if
and only if cN  1. Finally, let A(c) = B(c) [ D(c).
Roughly speaking, rule R works as follows. For claim proles in [4
j=0Cj, we specify awards to
agents according to their claims being larger than H or not. For claim proles in P, rule R does
the following: it rst ranks agents from highest claim to lowest claim. Then, to all agents in the
set B(c), R gives their full claim, and allocates the residual amount equally to agents in D(c). All
other agents receive 0.
Ri(c;1) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > :
1=4; c 2 C4 [ C0;
1=6; ci  H and c 2 C3;
1=2; ci > H and c 2 C3;
1=3; ci  H and c 2 C2;
1=6; ci > H and c 2 C2;
0; ci  H and c 2 C1;
1=3; ci > H and c 2 C1;
ci; c 2 P and i 2 B(c);
1 cB(c)
jD(c)j ; c 2 P and i 2 D(c);
0; c 2 P and i = 2 A(c):
We prove in Appendix A (Claim 1) that rule R satises eciency, equal treatment of equals,
and claims monotonicity. Next, we show that the prole of claims c = (1;1=3;1=3;1=3) is an
equilibrium in  (R;1) and since R(c;1) = (1=2;1=6;1=6;1=6), we have a violation of equal division
in equilibrium.
Note that c 2 C3. Then, a unilateral deviation by agent 1 can only result in a claim prole that
belongs to one of the sets C3, C4, or P, which induces the amounts (for agent 1) 1=2, 1=4, or 0,
respectively. Since at c agent 1 obtains 1=2, no unilateral deviation from c is benecial for agent 1.
Next, a unilateral deviation by agent k 2 f2;3;4g can only result in a claim prole that belongs to
one of the sets C2, C3, or P, which induces the amounts (for agent k) 1=6, 1=6, or 0, respectively.
Since at c agent k obtains 1=6, no unilateral deviation from c is benecial for agent k. 
Note that the rule described in Example 1 violates weak order preservation and others oriented
claims monotonicity.
Finally, we show that equal division is restored in the equilibrium result of Theorem 2 for
more than three agents by adding a non-manipulation property: nonbossiness (Satterthwaite and
Sonnenschein, 1981) requires that no agent can change other agents' awards by changing his claim
without changing his own award.
Nonbossiness: A rule R satises nonbossiness if for all (c;E) 2 EN and all i 2 N such that
Ri(c;E) = Ri(c0
i;c i;E), Rj(c;E) = Rj(c0
i;c i;E) for all j 6= i.
Theorem 3. Assume that for some k 2 R++,  c = k1. Let R satisfy eciency, equal treatment of
equals, claims monotonicity, and nonbossiness. Then,
(a) ^ c =  c is a Nash equilibrium of the claim game  (R;E) and




(a) This part follows immediately from claims monotonicity.
(b) We rst prove that equal treatment of equals, claims monotonicity, and nonbossiness imply
equal division for all Nash equilibria. Suppose that ^ c is a Nash equilibrium of the claim game
 (R;E) and for some i;j 2 N, (i) Ri(^ c;E) 6= Rj(^ c;E). Hence, by equal treatment of equals
^ ci 6= ^ cj. Without loss of generality assume that ^ ci < ^ cj. Let c0
i = ^ cj and consider (c0
i;^ c i;E). Since
^ c is a Nash equilibrium, Ri(c0
i;^ c i;E)  Ri(^ c;E). By claims monotonicity, Ri(c0
i;^ c i;E)  Ri(^ c;E).
Hence, (ii) Ri(c0
i;^ c i;E) = Ri(^ c;E). Thus, by nonbossiness, (iii) Rj(c0
i;^ c i;E) = Rj(^ c;E). Then,
(i), (ii), and (iii) imply Ri(c0
i;^ c i;E) 6= Rj(c0
i;^ c i;E); a contradiction to equal treatment of equals.
Therefore, for all i;j 2 N, Ri(^ c;E) = Rj(^ c;E), which proves an equal division vector is induced by
all Nash equilibria. By eciency, this equal division vector equals minfk; E
ng1.
From the proof of Theorem 3 it becomes clear that even without eciency Nash equilibria
outcomes respect equal division. However, without eciency, some part of the estate might be
wasted.
Note that the rule described in Example 1 violates nonbossiness.
Remark 3. Independence of Assumptions in Theorem 3
Note that claims monotonicity alone implies Theorem 2 (a). Hence, we show independence only
for Theorem 2 (b).
(i) The proof that the assumption  c = k1 is needed is the same as in Remark 1 (i).
(ii) As explained after the proof of Theorem 3, eciency is only needed to obtain the ecient equal
division vector as equilibrium outcome. The following inecient proportional rule satises equal
treatment of equals, claims monotonicity, and nonbossiness, but not eciency: for all (c;E) 2 EN,
P0(c;E) = P(c;E=2).
(iii) To prove that equal treatment of equals is needed one can use the serial dictatorship rule as
described in Remark 1 (iii) { it satises eciency, claims monotonicity, and nonbossiness but not
equal treatment of equals
(iv) To prove that claims monotonicity is needed one can use rule R00 as described in Remark 1 (iv)
{ it satises eciency, equal treatment of equals, and nonbossiness, but not claims monotonicity.
(v) To prove that nonbossiness is needed one can use the same rule as in Example 1 { it satises
equal treatment of equals, and claims monotonicity, but not nonbossiness. 
Remark 4. Nash Equilibria in  (P;E),  (CEA;E) and  (CEL;E)
The proportional rule, the constrained equal awards rule, and the constrained equal losses rule
satisfy all properties introduced in this article. Hence, for these rules, claiming the largest possible
amount is always an equal division Nash equilibrium. For the proportional rule and the constrained
equal losses rule, this is the unique Nash equilibrium of the associated claim game. However, if
agents are allowed to claim more than an equal share of the estate, the constrained equal awards
rule admits multiple (in fact innitely many) equal division Nash equilibria. This dierence stems
from the fact that under the proportional rule and the constrained equal losses rule, claiming the
whole estate is a strictly dominant strategy for all agents whereas under the constrained equal
awards rule, it is a weakly dominant strategy.
114 Concluding Remarks
We analyze situations where an estate should be distributed among a set of agents, but claims to
the estate are impossible or dicult to verify. We model a simple and intuitive claim game where,
given the estate and a rule satisfying some basic properties, agents simply announce their claims.
Our results show that rst of all, claiming the largest possible amount is always a Nash equilibrium.
Of course, this is an intuitive and not very surprising result. However, in addition, we show that
even though we do not focus on any specic rule to be used in our claim game, equal division is the
unique Nash equilibrium outcome. Since most well-known rules satisfy all the properties we require
(e.g., the proportional, the constrained equal awards, and the constrained equal losses rule), our
results can be interpreted as a noncooperative support for equal division in estate division. Finally,
future research on this topic might analyze situations in which partial verication is possible and
agents spend resources to support their claims (e.g., hiring a lawyer in a court case).
Appendix A
Claim 1. Rule R as dened in Example 1 satises equal treatment of equals, eciency, and claims
monotonicity.
Proof. Equal treatment of equals follows immediately from the denition of rule R.
Eciency: Note that for all c 2 [4
j=0Cj, cN  1 and
P
Rl(c;1) = 1. Assume that c 2 P. If












jD(c)j + 0 = 1:
Claims Monotonicity: Let i 2 N, c = (ci;c i), and c0 = (c0
i;c i) such that ci < c0
i. We show that
Ri(c;1)  Ri(c0
i;1) for the following (exhaustive) cases.
Case 1: c;c0 2 P.
If i = 2 A(c), then Ri(c;1) = 0  Ri(c0;1). If i 2 A(c), then i 2 A(c0), i.e., i 2 B(c0) or i 2 D(c0).
If i 2 B(c0), then Ri(c;1)  ci  c0
i = Ri(c0;1) and we are done. Assume that i 2 D(c0). Since
ci < c0
i, for all j 2 N n B(c), cj < c0
i. Hence, A(c0) n fig  B(c). Therefore, for all j 2 B(c0),
Rj(c0;1) = Rj(c;1), and for all j 2 D(c0) n fig, Rj(c0;1)  Rj(c;1). Thus, we showed that for all
j 2 A(c0) n fig, Rj(c0;1)  Rj(c;1). Since for all j 2 N n A(c0), Rj(c0;1) = 0 and R is ecient it
follows that Ri(c;1)  Ri(c0;1).
Case 2: c 2 P and for some j 2 f0;1;2;3;4g, c0 2 Cj.
Note that L(c) = fig and LH(c)[H(c) = N nfig. Since L  1=3, cNnfig  1 and
P
l6=i Rl(c;1) = 1.
Thus, Ri(c;1) = 1  
P
l6=i Rl(c;1) = 0  Ri(c0;1).
Case 3: for some j 2 f0;1;2;3;4g, c 2 Cj and c0 2 Cj.
Note that either [i 2 LH(c) and i 2 LH(c0)] or [i 2 H(c) and i 2 H(c0)]. Thus, Ri(c;1) = Ri(c0;1).
Case 4: for some j 2 f1;2;3;4g, c 2 Cj and c0 2 Cj 1.
Note that i 2 LH(c) and i 2 H(c0). Then, by the denition of R, for j = 1;4, Ri(c;1) < Ri(c0;e)
and for j = 2;3, Ri(c;1) = Ri(c0;1).
12Appendix B
In this appendix we describe what happens if we require that the estate E is always completely
allocated among the agents. Formally, a (full division) rule is a function R : EN ! RN that




First, all our property results from Section 2 (i.e., Lemmas 1 { 4) can be stated similarly without
mentioning eciency and in the proofs the fact that the whole estate is always allocated is used
instead of eciency.
Second, we consider our results in Section 3. Note that Lemma 5 does not hold anymore, i.e., it
is not always the case that in every Nash equilibrium ^ c of the claim game  (R;E), ^ cN  E; e.g., for
the constant rule that always assigns E=n to each agent, every claim vector is a Nash equilibrium.
Although this lemma is used in some of our proofs, it is used only in order to show that in
equilibrium the entire estate is allocated. Hence, again the fact that the whole estate is always
allocated is used instead of Lemma 5. Furthermore, all results that state that the division vector
in a Nash equilibrium is minfk; E
ng1 are changed to have the E
n1 division vector. To summarize,
Theorems 1 { 3 and Corollaries 1 and 2 hold with minimal changes in the statements and proofs.
Finally, the only adjustment of Example 1 needed to t the model described here is to change rule
R in Example 1 to rule ~ R as follows: for every c = 2 P let ~ R(c;E) = R(c;E) and for every c 2 P let
~ R(c;E) = E
4 .
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